ADOPTION, THE TERMINATION OF
PARENTAL RIGHTS AND BABY M
James B. Boskey *
The unique though not unexpected feature of the opinion of
the NewJersey Supreme Court in In re Baby M,' is how little it has
to do with the concept of surrogacy. Although the case received
national publicity as the first time the issue of surrogacy was fully
presented to an American court, the real issue of concern was not
surrogacy itself, but rather the proper standards for the termination of parental rights.2
That the case should focus on this issue is not surprising, as
the court was not asked to approve or disapprove the concept of
surrogacy, an issue that the court quite properly noted is one for
a legislative rather than a judicial body," nor to declare the respective rights of parties under an executory surrogate parent
contract, but rather to decide the question of whether there was a
sufficient basis to sever the relationship between Baby M4 and
her biological mother, Mrs. Whitehead.'
There are three different statutory bases for the termination
of parental rights in New Jersey." Both the "general" termination statute 7 and the "surrender" termination statutes were map* Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. A.B., Princeton Uni-

versity, 1964; J.D., University of Michigan, 1967; LL.M., London School of Economics, 1972.
I In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988).
2 For an alternative discussion on the termination of parental rights, see Hornstein, Termination of Parental Rights, 7 N.J. FAM. LAW., Feb. 1988, at 117.
3 Baby .I, 109 N.J. at 411, 537 A.2d at 1235.
4 Although the child's name now seems to be firmly established as Melissa, she
will be referred to in this article as "Baby M," the name by which she was known in
the litigation.
5 As a result of her divorce and remarriage, the mother's name is now Gould,
but she will be referred to herein as Mrs. Whitehead, the name used in the
litigation.
6 See generally, Boskey & McCue, Alternative Standards for the Termination of Parental
Rights, 9 SETON HALL L. REv. 1 (1978).
7 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-15 (West 1981). The general termination statute
provides four bases for the termination of parental rights. The first and second
require either that a conviction of abuse, abandonment, neglect or cruelty has been
entered against the parent of the child or that the child has been adjudged delinquent, neither of which was true in this case. The third and fourth grounds require,
as a predicate to the action, that the child is or has been, under the care or custody
of the New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services, similarly making them
inapplicable to the case at bar.

866

SYMPOSIUM

867

plicable by their terms to the situation in the Baby M case.
Termination of parental rights, therefore, if it were to occur,
would have to have been justified under the termination of parental rights provisions of the New Jersey adoption law," or
under some new or nonstatutory legal doctrine.
The action for the termination of parental rights has been
described by judges as being one of the most painful processes in
which they are obligated to participate. Not only is the parentchild relationship constitutionally protected,"' but the emotional
consequences of such a termination are often extreme. Nonetheless, the termination of parental rights may often be necessary for
the protection of the child from a parent who is unwilling or unable to provide the child a suitable upbringing. The extreme nature of the relief, and the need to give all due deference to the
underlying constitutional privilege, has meant that the relief
should only be granted in extraordinary cases where no other
suitable solution is available, unless the remedy is fully and voluntarily agreed to by the surrendering parent.
Actions for the termination of parental rights can be divided
into two classes: those where a parent (or parents) voluntarily
surrenders rights with regard to a child, and those where the termination is involuntary, made over the objection of the parent.
In the first class of cases, voluntary surrender, the essential question which must be addressed is whether the surrender was truly
voluntary. A number of issues can arise in making that
determination.
The first question to be answered is whether the surrender
falls within the provisions of the New Jersey adoption statute.''
Under that statute, a surrender must be evidenced
by a signed instrument acknowledged by the person executing
the same before an officer authorized to take acknowledgements or proofs in the State in which the instrument is executed, such officer first having made known the contents of the
instrument to the person making the acknowledgment and
having been satisfied as to the identity of the person executing
8 1d. § 9:2-18 (West 1976). The surrender termination statute requires, for its
applicability, that the child in question be under the supervision of an approved
agency. Baby M was never under agency supervision, and the statute is, therefore,
inapplicable 'b its own terms.
1) See id. §§ 9:3-41, -45, -48(c)(1) (West Supp. 1988).
1o E.g. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972): Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters. 268 U.S.
510 (1925).
I See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:3-37 to -41.1 (West Supp. 1988). This statute establishes the conditions for a surrender to be directly enforceable.
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the surrender, which the officer shall certify on2 the instrument
of surrender or on a paper attached thereto.1
Such a surrender is only fully effective, however, if the recipient of
the surrender (the party receiving custody and guardianship of the
child in question) is an "approved agency.'"'" :
Where an approved agency receives such a surrender, "[s]uch
surrender shall constitute relinquishment of such person's parental
rights in or guardianship or custody of the child named therein and
consent by such person to adoption of the child." 4 The special authority granted to such agencies to receive children on the basis of
direct surrender is granted to them on the assumption that they will
assure that the surrender is not being provided under duress," 5 and
that the agency will have
1. Offered [the surrendering parent(s)] counseling that fully
explores alternative plans for the child, including but not limited to temporary foster care, day care and care by relatives;
2. Informed [the surrendering parent(s)] that only legal parents or legal guardians have the right to custody and control
of their child and to surrender their child for adoption;
3. Prepared [the surrendering parent(s)], along with the
child for surrender and separation;
4. Referred [the surrendering parent](s) to other community
resources when the agency cannot provide needed services;
5. Informed [the surrendering parent(s)] that the agency
may contact them in the future if the adult adoptee or adoptive
family or emancipated minor requests information or wishes
to meet the birth parents;
6. Advised [the surrendering parents(s)] that they may sign a
written agreement at any time indicating their willingness to
be contacted and/or provide information if requested by the
adoptee or adoptive family; and
7. Asked [the surrendering parent(s)] to update and submit
to the agency their address(es) and/or any significant medical
information required on the Medical Information Form, so
that the medical information could be shared with the adoptive family and/or the adult adoptee. "
12

Id. § 9:3-41 (a).

13 An "approved agency" is defined as "a nonprofit corporation, association or

agency, including any public agency, approved by the Department of Human Services for the purpose of placing children for adoption in NewJersey." Id. § 9:3-38(a)
(West Supp. 1988).
'4- Id. § 9:3-41 (a).
15 This requirement is incorporated in the Manual of Standards for Adoption
Agencies. See N.J. ADMIN. CoDE tit. 10, § 121A-5.4 (1987).
16 Id. § 121A-5.4(c).
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In addition, the agency is required to "ensure that the birth parents
understand the terms of the surrender and realize that the agency
will assume custody and will have the right to consent to the adoption of the child," among other things, "and ensure that the full
terms of this understanding are delineated in writing signed and
17
dated by the birth parent(s) and agency."
With the provision of these protections and assurances, the surrender granted to the agency "constitute[s] relinquishment of [the
surrendering parent's ] . . . parental rights in or guardianship or custody of the child named therein and consent by such person to
adoption of the child."' 8 Moreover, such a surrender "shall be valid
and binding without regard to the age of the person executing the
surrender.' ' With one exception this is the only manner in which a
direct surrender of a child for placement is fully effective in New
Jersey. -0 Moreover, even with these protections, a surrender
granted to an approved agency is not immune from attack by a birth
parent, and may be set aside on a finding of fraud, duress, mistake
of fact, or such other basis as would allow the rescission of a civil
contract.2'

Where a surrender is given to one other than an approved
agency, the effectiveness of the surrender is even more open to
question. There is no statutory authority for honoring such a surrender, and the language of the adoption statute makes it quite clear
that such surrender has no per se legal effect. The surrender may
serve as some evidence of the intent of a parent to surrender his or
her parental rights, so that a child may be adopted, or of the failure
22
of the parent to meet the standards for objecting to an adoption,17 Id. § 121A-5.4(d).
18 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-41(a).
1!) Id.
2o The exception is that a New Jersey approved agency may accept a surrender
from an agency approved to place children for adoption in another state or foreign
country. Id. § 9:3-4 1(b).
21 See Sorentino v. Family and Children's Soc'y of Elizabeth, 72 N.J. 127, 367

A.2d 1168 (1976). This is not to say that every such objection will be honored, In re
D., 61 N.J. 89, 293 A.2d 171 (1972), but only that the surrender's validity is open to
appropriate question. See also Sorentino v. Family and Children's Soc'y of Elizabeth, 74 N.J. 313, 378 A.2d 18 (1977).
22 Section § 9:3-46(a) of New Jersey Statutes Annotated provides for a parent
who has not executed a surrender pursuant to section 9:3-41 (which would apply in
any case where a surrender was not given to an approved agency) to enter an objection to the adoption of his or her child. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-46(a) (West Supp.
1988). The section provides that:
No judgment of adoption shall be entered over an objection of such
parent . . . unless the court finds that such parent has substantially failed

to perform the regular and expected parental functions ofcare and sup-
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but it does not, in and of itself, provide a basis for the termination of
parental rights. The court must, in the course of the preliminary
hearing 2' in an adoption action, confirm the failure of the parents to
meet the standards for objecting to the adoption -4 or determine that
the parents have lost their rights to the child under the standards set
forth in the statute. -5
In the Baby M case, the fundamental claim was that the contract
signed by the parties2 i could serve as a surrender of parental rights
on the part of the Whiteheads ' 7 so as to permit the adoption of the
child by Mrs. Stern, the wife of the father of the child. -8 In order for
that claim to succeed, the contract had to serve as a complete surrender or it would have been necessary to prove that an independent basis for the termination of Mrs. Whitehead's parental rights
existed.
Although substantial proofs regarding Mrs. Whitehead's
parenting abilities and relationship with the child were presented in
the case, there could be little question that the statutory standard
port of the child, which shall include maintenance of an emotional relationship with the child.
Id.
2'3 The preliminary hearing is required in any case where the child to be adopted
is not received from an approved agency N.J. STAT. ANN. 9:3-48 (West Supp. 1988).
24 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-46(a) (West Supp. 1988).
25 The standard is "failure to make timely objection to the adoption ... or intentional abandonment or very substantial neglect of parental duties without a reasonable expectation of a reversal of that conduct in the future." Id. § 9:3-48(c)(1).
Some trial courts have suggested that the standards set forth in section 9:348(c)(1) of New Jersey Statutes Annotated must be met in every case, but a careful
reading of the statute makes it clear that if the standard presented in section 9:346(a) is met, there is no need to deal with the section 9:3-48(c)(1) standard for
termination as the parents would not have been able to make a timely and effective
objection under the earlier section.
24i The contract included as parties Mr. Stern, the biological father, Mrs.
Whitehead, the biological/surrogate mother, and Mr. Whitehead, the then husband
of Mrs. Whitehead.
27 Mr. Whitehead, although not the biological father of the child, possessed, at
least arguably, parental rights with regard to the child as the husband of the biological mother. It is interesting to note that the wife of the biological father apparently
does not have similar rights although her biological relationship to the child is not
distinguishable from Mr. Whitehead's. This derives from the traditional rule that
the husband of the mother, but not the wife of the father, is, at least rebuttably,
presumed to be the biological father of the child. See H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DoMESTIc RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 310-11 (2d ed. 1987).
28 The contract provided, among other things, that
I. MARY BETH WHITEHEAD ... agrees ... Itol terminate all parental rights to said child ....
landl
2. . .. RICHARD WHITEHEAD . .. acknowledges that he will do all
acts necessary to rebut the presumption of paternity ....
Baby .11, 109 N.J. at 470, 537 A.2d at 1265 (Appendix A).
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for termination of parental rights was not met. Having attempted to
maintain custody of the child,"' Mrs. Whitehead had made full efforts to perform the "regular and expected parental functions of
care and support of the child," and an "emotional relationship" had
been established by virtue of her attempts to maintain custody and
the visitation ordered by the court."'° Thus Mrs. Whitehead met the
standards of the adoption statute to qualify as having a right to object to the adoption of the child."'
Having established Mrs. Whitehead's right to object to the
adoption, the remaining question is whether her objection was entitled to be honored. There was clearly no "intentional abandonment
or very substantial neglect of parental duties," '13 2 and thus no basis
for the termination of her parental rights.
An alternative argument made to and by the trial court was that
the court had an inherent power to terminate Mrs. Whitehead's parental rights on the basis of the best interests of child."3 This argument has powerful appeal since the responsibility of the courts as
210 Even if it were found that she had been unable to fulfill these functions, it
would not have been fatal to her claim if the cause of her inability were intervention
by third parties (including the court) against her will. See Sorentino v. Family and
Children's Soc'y of Elizabeth, 72 N.J. 127, 367 A.2d 1168 (1976). If her inability
had been personal, i.e., due to mental or psychological deficiency, other issues
would have arisen, and termination might have been allowed despite the inability,
A.L. v. P.A., 213 N.J. Super. 391, 517 A.2d 494 (App. Div. 1986), if it was necessary
for the best interests of the child, but in this case there was no serious indication
that she would have been unable to provide suitable care for the child as either
custodial or visiting parent.
30 The child was voluntarily placed in her custody shortly after birth and remained in her custody during the period of her flight to Florida. In addition, she
was, appropriately, provided with regular visitation during the pendency of the action and she exercised the visitation on a consistent basis maintaining a parentchild relationship with her daughter.
:3' N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-46 (West Supp. 1988).
32 Id. § 9:3-48(c)(1) (West Supp. 1988).
33 Authority for this approach can be found although the courts have not directly adopted it. In New Jersey l)iv. of Youth and Family Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J.
591, 512 A.2d 438 (1986), the court appears to move beyond the statutory grounds
to allow the termination of parental rights in order to protect the interests of the
subject children. In that case the court pointed out that:
A court analyzing the ability of the parents to give their children
care should not look at the parents to determine whether they are themselves unfit or whether they are the victims of social circumstances beyond their control; it should only determine whether it is reasonably
foreseeable that the parents can cease to inflict harm upon the children
entrusted to their care. No more and no less is required of them than
that they will not place their children in substantial jeopardy to physical
or mental health.
Id. at 607, 512 A.2d at 447.
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parens patria"4 is a serious one and the goal of protecting the best
interests of children is one that has been broadly recognized."'
Assuming the propriety of such a- standard for the termination
of parental rights, however, the question remains as to the proper
interpretation to be given to the phrase "best interests of the child."
It is clear that the term is not a comparative one, and that the courts
are not to determine the "better interests" of a child."' As the appellate court pointed out in In re Cope, "[ijt is not a choice between a
home with all the amenities and a simple apartment, or an upbringing with the classics on the bookshelf as opposed to the mass media,
or even between parents or providers of vastly unequal skills." ' 7 If
the courts were to allow such a standard to apply, the effect would
be to allow any would-be parent from a suburban home to select
most children from the inner city, take them into their homes, and
then adopt them, depriving them of all contact with their former
families.
Rather than comparative, the standard for best interests must
be an absolute one based on a demonstration that the child's
"health and development have been or probably will be impaired
...or that the parent is incapable of caring for the child or unwilling
to do so."" Among the important considerations is the state's public policy of maintaining the integrity of the biological family.3 '
Even if the biological family is not functioning, the goal of preserving biological ties is still deemed of importance and, where a child is
removed from a parent's home, an effort will generally be made to
place that child with other biological relatives."' Similarly, in a divorce situation, one biological parent's spouse will generally not be
allowed to adopt the spouse's child without the consent of the other
biological parent. 4 The same rule applies even where the biological parents were not married to each other, unless the standards for
34 For a discussion of the doctrine of parens paitiae, see generally Boskey & McCue, supra note 6, at 18.
.15 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-37 (West Supp. 1988) (establishing best interests of children as a primary basis for the interpretation of the adoption law).
3 In re Cope, 106 N.J. Super. 336, 340-41, 255 A.2d 798, 801 (App. Div. 1969).
37 Id.

38 Id.
3. See New Jersey Div. of Youth and Family Servs. v. B.W., 157 N.J. Super. 301,
308, 384 A.2d 923, 926 (Camden County Ct. 1977).
40 See New Jersey Div. of Youth and Family Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591,609, 512
A.2d 438, 448 (1986).
41 See, e.g., In reJ.J.P., 175 N.J. Super. 420, 419 A.2d 1135 (App. Div. 1980); In re
Neuwirth's Estate, 155 N.J. Super. 410, 382 A.2d 972 (Monmouth County Ct.
1978).
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termination of that parent's rights have been met. 4 2
It is clear that in the Baby M case these standards could not be
met, and, thus, even if an inherent power of termination of parental
rights on the basis of "best interests" exists, that standard could not
be met. Mrs. Whitehead was and remains the biological parent of
Baby M, and the lack of any showing of incapacity to care for the
child or necessary implication of direct harm to the child, from her
exposure to her mother, means that parental rights could not be
severed. The inconvenience of maintaining a relationship between
the mother and a child who would be living with her father and his
wife, and the discomfort of that couple in dealing with the situation
is understandable, but it is a problem that is dealt with on a regular
basis in post-divorce custody situations and not infrequently in the
case of nonmarital children. The situation, while in many ways possibly detrimental to the child, supports the fundamental goal of allowing the child to know and maintain a relationship with his or her
biological parents.
What then have been the consequences of the Baby M decision
on the law of termination of parental rights in NewJersey? The first
consequence is the continued recognition of the fact that a grant of
a surrender to one other than an approved agency is not binding4
and requires review by a court before it can be effective. 4 Even
more important is the recognition that such agreements cannot be
irrevocable and are subject to a right of rescission.4
Also of substantial importance is the court's confirmation of the
fact that a surrender for purposes of adoption cannot be granted
42 In re A.R., 152 N.J. Super. 541, 378 A.2d 87 (Union County Ct. 1977). The
same implication can be drawn from In re Mercado, 182 NJ. Super. 628, 442 A.2d
1078 (App. )iv. 1982).

43

"liit is not clear that there could be any 'order or judgment of a court of

competent jurisdiction' validating a surrender of custody as a basis for adoption
when that surrender was not in conformance with the statute.- Baby 1, 109 N:. at
430, 537 A.2d at 1244. [he court continues by pointing out that only surrenders to

an approved agency meet this criterion.
44 Indeed it can be argued from the opinion that the private surrender has no
etfect, see id. at 433-34, 537 A.2d at 1246, although the better view would appear to
be that it may be some evidence of the propriety of terminating parental rights in
an ap)ropriate case.
-15 Id.
at 430, 537 A.2d at 1244. The court notes especially the following statutory language:
Except as otherwise provided by law or by order orjudgment of a court

of competent jurisdiction or by testamentary disposition, no surrender
of the custody of a child shall be valid in this State unless made to an
approved agency . . . ."

Id. (quoting NJ.

SrAi . ANN.

§ 9:2-14 (West 1976)).
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prior to the birth of the child. 4 11 This rule, which has been widely
assumed to exist without confirmation in the case of the biological
mother, is now clearly applicable as well to the biological father.4 7
One policy basis for this rule is that the natural mother is
irrevocably committed [to the surrender of her rights in the
absence of such a rule] before she knows the strength of her
bond with her child. She never makes a totally voluntary, informed decision, for quite clearly any decision prior to the
baby's birth is, in the most important sense, uninformed, and
any decision after that, compelled by a pre-existing contractual
commitment, the threat of a lawsuit, and the inducement of a
$10,000 payment, is less than totally voluntary.4 8
The New Jersey Supreme Court further recognized that the
rights of the biological parents of a child are not determined by
their marital status. The court noted specifically the language of the
Parentage Act that, "[t]he parent and child relationship extends
equally to every child and to every parent, regardless of the marital
status of the parents" 4 9 and the accompanying statement of the Assembly Judiciary Committee to the bill enacting the statute confirmed, "the principle that regardless of the marital status of the
parent, all children and all parents have equal rights with respect to
each other."")

Another issue of importance is the court's rejection of the use
of money to induce a surrender of parental rights. The court's starting point makes it clear how fundamental it perceived the issue of
money for custody or termination to be.
This [the surrogacy contract] is the sale of a child, or, at
46 The court notes that "[t]he contract's basic premise, that the natural parents
can decide in advance of birth which one is to have custody of the child, bears no
relationship to the settled law that the child's best interests shall determine custody." Id. at 434, 537 A.2d at 1246 (citations omitted). This applies even with
regard to a surrender to an approved agency under the terms of the statute: "We
construe the statute to allow a surrender only after the birth of the child." Id. at
431, 537 A.2d at 1245.
47 The court notes the rights of the biological father in the strongest terms:
"The surrogacy contract violates the policy of this State that the rights of natural
parents are equal concerning their child .... 'The parent and child relationship
extends equally to every child and to every parent, regardless of the marital status
of the parents.' " Id. at 435-36, 537 A.2d at 1247 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:1740 (West Supp. 1988)).
48 Id. at 437, 537 A.2d at 1248.
4,9 Id. at 436-37, 537 A.2d at 1247 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-40 (West Supp.
1988)).
50 Id. at 436, 537 A.2d at 1247 (quoting ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY, LAw, PUBLIC
SAFETY & DEFENSE COMM., STATEMENT TO SENATE No. 888, L.1983, c.17, 200th
Leg., 2d Sess. (1983)).
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the very least, the sale of a mother's right to her child, the only
mitigating factor being that one of the purchasers is the father.
Almost every evil that prompted the prohibition of the payment of money in connection with adoptions exists here. 5
The adoption statute prohibits the payment or acceptance of
any money or other valuable consideration in connection with the
placement of a child for adoption.5" An express exception is made
for the fees or services of an approved agency and for the payment
or reimbursement of medical, hospital or other similar expenses incurred in connection with the birth or any illness of the child,5" and
an exception is necessarily implied for reasonable attorney fees for
legal services in connection with the placement of the child.5 4 To
attempt to assure that this section is not violated, the statute requires the adoptive parent, except in relative and stepparent adoptions, to file a detailed verified report of all sums paid in connection
with the adoption. 5 If it appears that the provisions on payment for
adoption have been violated, the court is directed to refer the matter to the appropriate county prosecutor.:
The court noted that the problem of payment of money in
adoption cases was even more apparent in the case of surrogacy. In
adoption cases the payment does not produce the problem (if it is
appropriate to describe the birth of a child in this manner), whereas
with surrogacy the issue of the purchase of the woman's procreative
capacity is the primary function of the payment.5 7 The fundamental
issues are the introduction of a middle person, motivated primarily
if not exclusively by profit, who is unlikely to assure that the appropriate protections are provided to the surrendering mother where
those protections might cost the broker his or her fee,5 X and the fact
that the payment of money may, in many cases, lead the biological
parent to make a decision that is inappropriate for his or her needs
and that of the child. Again, the court focuses clearly on the fact
that allowing payment to control the decision compromises the
Id. at 437-38, 537 A.2d at 1248.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-54(a) (West Supp. 1988).
53 Id. § 9:3-54(b).
54 The full bounds of this exception have never been determined, but, as it is
clear that an attorney may not participate in the arrangements for or the actual
placement, the exception appears to be quite limited. See In reN.P., 165 N.J. Super.
591, 398 A.2d 937 (Law Div. 1979); but see In re I.T., 164 N.J. Super. 476, 397 A.2d
341 (App. Div. 1978) (limiting the effect of this section to raising the possibility of
criminal prosecution rather than preventing the adoption).
55 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-55 (West Supp. 1988).
56 Id. § 9:3-55(b).
57 Baby .1, 109 N.J. at 438, 537 A.2d at 1248.
58 Id. at 439, 537 A.2d at 1249.
51

52
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needed focus on the best interests of the child.5 9
In conclusion, it is clear that, at least one of the primary foci of
the Baby M decision was the appropriate bases for termination of
parental rights. The court has reaffirmed its prior views as to the
care needed in dealing with these actions and has mandated strict
scrutiny, not only of the legal processes, but also of the pre- and
extra-legal processes involved in such actions. The court is to be
commended for the careful scrutiny it has given to these policy issues and for its recognition of the need to protect first the interests
of children and second the interests of all participants in the
process.
59

Id., 537 A.2d at 1248-49.

